

Dec 95

On Hiroshima:

Exonerate bst: Which Pres. would have
acted differently?

He? ~~was~~ (maybe at the time, when
he was genl.!

But, as shown by his decisions on
H-bomb, as Pres, or New York, ...

Of course, that was for
threat, not attack;

still, look at Korea!

That was after Hiroshima.

Still, it was as Pres —

CBJ?

JFK? (see CII)

N? / F? Regan? Carter? Bush? (refused to
apologize, or
re-think!

see Clinton!

How about: FDR?

- 1 - Japan bombing (see Edm)
- Dresden, Berlin,
- Hamburg

How abt. explains differences between FDR + bst; but
H. SW, anti-SU (see next page)

CHURCHILL! (Did de Gaulle have an opinion?)

~~to do~~ Any dissent from area leading at
Right ends = UE? (see, Tjoland, snow — on
moral-legal grounds?

What if kindness numbers be
been right?)

equivalent to
Tjoland critique of
de-bombing.

2 arguments over handling of
data of Nazi doctors,
design of experiments,
cost (of "info")

GALPenny on FDR/OST:

see BB

1. He emphasizes difference, wrt. SU, Collab, CW
2. But Sherrin disagrees.

2. No difference on area bombing - unless
FDR was bloodier!

HST invented this practice!

Not only was precedent created, but
institutional procedures were in place, functioning
(and lack of challenge, controversy in USG)

3. Issue of intimidating SU was less critical
to "decision" than GA makes it;
almost surely, not necessary to decision;
and not necessary to many aspects of
decision (e.g. failure to offer terms to Japan)
Thus, difference on this, less

4. On other side: poss. more FDR concern for
long-run, non-prolif, non-arm race,
pro-collab. (more openness to England-Frank
argument, if he had lived to hear it)

5. BUT (vs. GA):

REJECTS BOHR PROPOSAL

FDR (quoting in, perhaps, to Churchill on this)

rejects collab. with Soviets on A-bomb;

decides on secretary; does this not mean at

vs. "int. control," — postwar monopoly (with UK)? Would this
not fit with desire to intimidate SU?

AND EVEN BOHR AGREED WITH USE OF BOMB! (close better over Fanni
approach to triggering Hg. but)

As for postwar arm race: Wf would FDR (like
Churchill) ^{not} have agreed with Commit, et al: on
and for demonstration: to intimidate, some would

(overturn SU)

ASK: (ie. US, Congress...) into "int. control"

(What would she have done - 1961? 1964-65?) (IN VN)

and see LBJ's approach of N; and the attitude

My others: JFK

diffused a VN for

she (not in 54?) N, LBJ...

THUS, IF FDR DEATH (cf. JFK death, or VW) MADE NO DIFFERENCE - WHY BLAME
or LBJ/N? HST/IKE?

an FDR (cont).

-The most one could say is that FDR (& ~~Stinson~~?)
might have been more open to persuasion by
Spillane (and Frank - Reinhardt) against
an over-use, for long-run: then HST or Byrnes
and perhaps Bard (like, Kealey - but
did Kealey ever mention his
views to HST? or FDR?)

But Spillane would have been countered by
(Bahr?) Comant, Bush, Gross, Lammie, Compton (!)
Health Compton

Then, like like, Strauss, McCloy (Farrington?), Spillane, Frank
were more hands "self-directed"

Military view (self-serving?) that Bomb was not
necessary, militarily, was not the best word,
self consideration - or likely to be decisive!

~~Then~~ or AFTER ALL, VCS thought more
area bombing was not necessary, & was
directed a shift - but it didn't stop!
(see Aug 14-15!)

- USAF / Arnold motives... (see Kelley vs. ^{repetition} Hornell:
- and Gross / Comant / Oppie motives!
- and Anderson - MacLeish - Hall (vs. Gross) vs. off to Exp.
Byrnes

(There was an alternative view - it was "possible"
to be pressed - it was pressed!

But no proof that it was "possible"
for it to prevail - to be chosen? (That didn't happen -
could have - wasn't
even considered, at least)

[see use of this word in war planning]

Anticipation of - NUC planning
- VN planning!
war and, etc.